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ABSTRACT 
This study compares American and Chinese college students’ willingness to 
purchase GM crops and examines the factors that have a bearing on this behavioral 
intention. It examines how social trust and conspiracy beliefs influence risk and benefit 
perceptions using data gathered through an online survey. The findings indicate that trust in 
experts and strength of conspiracy beliefs are both significant predictors of perceived risks 
and benefits, and subsequent intentions to consume GM foods. . The results also show that 
the Chinese reported more ambivalent attitudes toward GM crops, perceiving higher 
benefits and higher risks, and consequently, had lower willingness to purchase GM foods. 
The Chinese respondents also registered weaker levels of social trust and stronger 
conspiracy beliefs.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Although it has been only 20 years since genetically modified (GM) crops have 
entered the market, they have been planted to an expanding area worldwide (Nelson, 2001).  
Their introduction has been greeted with contentious debates that rage to this day. 
Advocates argue that GM crops can help feed a growing world population, enhance the 
nutrient content of food items, and improve the quality of the environment due to the 
reduced use of pesticides, herbicides, and chemical fertilizers. Those against GMOs, on the 
other hand, stress that they pose yet unknown risks to human health, lead to gene pollution 
and thus harm biodiversity (Ando & Khanna, 2000). Some even contend that transgenic 
products do not offer economic and political justice (Wang, 2004), and are unethical 
because the technology tampers with nature (Nelson, 2001). Furthermore, some claim that 
contrary to what advocates have suggested, GMOs have so far failed to bring the real 
benefits to farmers they promised (Sewell, 2012). 
Given these competing arguments, researchers, particularly those from North 
America and Western Europe, have rushed to study the public’s attitudes and sentiments 
toward GMOs (e.g., Grunert et al., 2003; House et al., 2001; Costa-Font & Gil, 2009; 
Hallman et al., 2002). However, these studies have primarily focused on consumers in 
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developed economies and have accorded less attention to those in the developing world. 
This represents a major gap in scholarly attention considering that GM crops are being 
planted in more and more areas in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, South Africa, 
India, and China. 
According to the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech 
Applications (ISAAA), GM crops were grown in 134 million hectares worldwide in 2009, 
44% of which were in developing countries. The growth rate in acreage is thus much 
higher in developing countries (13%) than in the developed ones (2%) (GMO Compass, 
2010). Of the 16.7 million farmers who grew GM crops that year, 15 million were from the 
developing world (James, 2011). 
Despite this trend, studies of public perception among consumers in less 
industrialized countries have been few and far between. To help bridge the gap, this study 
compares the attitudes toward GMOs between American and Chinese consumers, two 
countries that have had tremendous (in the case of the US) and some (in the case of China) 
success in GM applications. The United States is, and still remains, the most important GM 
crop producer in the world, growing GM crops in 43.1% of its total acreage in 2010 (James, 
2011). American farmers grow GM corn, soybeans, cotton, canola, sugar beets, alfalfa, 
papaya, and pumpkin. Although China ranks only sixth in terms of area devoted to GM 
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crops (3.9 million hectares compared to America’s 69 million in 2010), seven million 
Chinese farmers grow GM cotton, papaya, poplar, potato, and sweet pepper (James, 2011). 
In 2009, China allowed the growing of two kinds of GM rice, which made it the first 
country to permit the commercialization of GM staple foods.  
Despite this rate of adoption, few studies have examined the Chinese people’s 
attitude toward GMOs. Among the few is a descriptive study that solicited the opinions of 
2,006 respondents in Zhejiang province, a relatively developed region, which found that 
people generally had an optimistic but cautious view of biotechnology (Lyu, 2006). Lyu 
(2006) reports that 67% of her respondents thought GM food would bring benefits to a lot 
of people; approximately 50% found the risks associated with GM food unacceptable; 67% 
believed that GM food endangers future generations; and that such risks are somehow 
significant relative to the risks people face on a daily basis. In another study, Chen and Li 
(2006) made use of structural equation modeling to probe 564 Taiwanese consumers’ 
attitudes using scales that had been originally developed to study the cognitions of 
consumers in other countries (Bredahl, 2001).   
A comparative look at the American and Chinese perspective is in order 
particularly because observers say that those in less developed countries are more prone to 
subscribe to conspiracy beliefs. According to Roukis (2006), this may be due partly to 
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uncertainties that go in tandem with technological advancements, which characterize rapid 
globalization. Such uncertainties, Roukis (2006) posits, make for a climate that is 
conducive to conspiracy thinking. Conspiracy believers see globalization as mostly driven 
by powerful transnational companies that use their influence to full advantage. More often 
than not, they surmise, it is used to generate more profit to the detriment of local welfare. 
For example, Monsanto, DuPont, and other agricultural biotech giants have long been 
accused of invading the international seed market so that farmers all over the world 
become dependent on them for farm inputs. By doing so, they threaten the food security of 
nations. In blogs and other websites, GM supporters are branded “lackeys of Monsanto” 
who are subjecting unsuspecting people to “Frankenfoods.” GM foods are described as 
“biological weapons that will lead to genocide.” Such beliefs are likely to color people’s 
opinions about GMOs and adversely impact the future applications of biotechnology for 
specific purposes. 
The present research is a comparative study of American and Chinese college 
students, examining whether there are differences in their attitudes toward and opinions 
about GM foods. Specifically, it tests the hypothesis that people’s trust in social institutions 
and the extent to which they subscribe to conspiracy beliefs will influence their attitude. 
The impact of trust on attitudes and attitude formation has been verified in previous studies 
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(e.g., Chen & Li, 2006; Costa-Font & Gil, 2009; Titchener & Sapp, 2002), but the 
influence of conspiracy beliefs on attitudes toward GMOs has not previously been 
examined.  
This study also attempts to answer the following questions: Do people in these two 
countries differ in the level of trust they assign to three social institutions (the government, 
the scientific community, and the media) that serve as the primary sources of information 
about genetic engineering and GM crops? Does this level of trust matter in people’s 
acceptance of conspiracy theories? To what extent is risk perception impacted by social 
trust? How do perceived risks and benefits affect consumer’s intentions to behave? What 
personality traits (e.g., cynicism and sense of control) have a bearing on the attitudes 
people hold about GM foods? This study offers a comprehensive examination of the 
factors that account for people’s attitudes toward GM foods.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Attitudes Toward Genetic Engineering and GM Crops 
Some qualitative studies suggest that instead of simply being “for” or “against,” 
people have more nuanced and sophisticated views about the GM issue (e.g., Poortinga & 
Pidgeon, 2006; Grove-White et al., 1997; Marris et al., 2001). For example, Marris et al. 
(2001) report that in their focus group studies, European participants demonstrated highly 
ambivalent, but also highly elaborated, arguments for or against GMOs.  
Portinga and Pidgeon (2006) lament that most survey and interview questionnaires 
ask respondents for their degree of support or rejection of GM products, thus failing to 
detect the complexities of people’s judgments and deliberations about the GM issue. To 
remedy this methodological weakness, they proposed a more comprehensive 
conceptualization, examining attitudes toward GMOs as being composed of three 
dimensions: (1) general evaluation, (2) involvement, and (3) certainty. They also analyzed 
two factors—perceived benefit and perceived risk—as determinants of people’s attitudes, 
hypothesizing that those who perceive high benefit and low risk will hold a positive 
attitude toward GM foods. On the other hand, when people perceive high risk and low 
benefit, they will hold a negative attitude. Those who see both high benefit and high risk 
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are seen as more likely to form an ambivalent attitude. Conversely, individuals who 
perceive low benefits and low risk are likely to regard GM as an unimportant issue, which 
may result in an indifferent view. This typology of potential effects is shown Figure 1.  
Moon and Balasubramanian (2004), following Poortinga and Pidgeon’s (2006) 
method, found that risk perception and benefit perception explained 66% of the variance in 
attitude toward GMOs. When trust, awareness, and other demographic variables were 
added to the model, the R
2
 increased only by 3%, which suggests that perceived risk and 
benefit almost completely mediate the effects of trust, psychological status, and personal 
characteristics on attitudes toward GMOs. Poortinga and Pidgeon’s model illustrated the 
array of variables found to influence attitudes, indicating the difficulty of deriving a simple 
way with which to determine how much people like or dislike something. The classic view 
is that attitudes require consistency in cognitive, affective, and behavioral associations, 
which may be, at times, implausible (Fazio & Olsen, 2003). To simplify the process, the 
intention to behave   was used in this study as implicit measurements of attitude toward 
GM foods.  
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Fig.1. Typology of resulting attitudes based on perceived risks and perceived benefits 
(Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2006) 
Two Approaches to Understanding Risk Perception 
Previous studies suggest that people evaluate risks related to scientific and 
technological innovations using one of two approaches. The first, the cognitive science 
approach, emphasizes knowledge acquisition. It posits that once knowledge is transmitted, 
it will lead to the acceptance of technology (Bradbury, 1989; Lupton, 1999). The second, 
the sociocultural approach, considers risk as a product of social processes, emphasizing 
that public opinion is strongly influenced by trust in the institutions seen as responsible for 
scientific and/or technological developments, value orientation, and the perceived social 
acceptability of the innovation (Bradbury, 1989; Earle, 2010). Titchener and Sapp (2002) 
applied the two approaches to characterize consumers’ opinions about biotechnology and 
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found significant effects for both (Titchener & Sapp, 2002). This finding supports Beck’s 
(1999) assertion that risk assessment should be understood in terms of the individual’s 
interpretations of information about the innovation, its perceived social acceptability, and 
the extent to which experts and regulatory bodies are trusted. 
Many studies have failed to find empirical support for the exclusively cognitive 
approach (e.g., Chen & Li, 2006; Šorgo & Ambrožič-Dolinšek, 2009; Bredahl, 2001), 
finding that risk and benefit perceptions are not necessarily equivalent. That is, health risk 
tended to be seen more as “impending” while potential economic and environmental 
benefits appear more “distant.” Furthermore, the test used to gauge knowledge levels about 
risky issues in previous research was found to be unsatisfactory (Šorgo & Ambrožič-
Dolinšek, 2009). Because of these, the present study adopts the sociocultural approach to 
examine the factors that may influence attitudes and attitude formation. 
Social Trust 
Many scholars have provided empirical evidence that trust in institutions known to 
have purview over science and technology in society plays an important role in attitude 
formation (e.g., Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2006; Costa-Font & Gil, 2009; Earle, 2010; Chen & 
Li, 2006). A cross-national study conducted in Mediterranean Europe reports a strong 
positive correlation between trust in experts and regulatory bodies and perceived benefits 
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of GM foods (r =0.47 to 0.5). They also note a moderate negative correlation between trust 
and perceived risks (r= -0.1 to -0.33) (Costa-Font & Gil, 2009). A similar study conducted 
in Taiwan noted the same pattern, indicating that trust strongly correlates with benefits 
perception (r=0.53), and finding a negative, albeit non-significant, correlation between trust 
and risk perception (r=-0.02) (Chen & Li, 2006). 
Siegrist and Cvetkovich (2000) posit that the lay public mainly relies on social trust 
when making judgments about the risks and benefits of a novel technology when personal 
knowledge is limited. This indicates that trust reduces the cost and complexity involved in 
making a rational judgment based on knowledge. The authors also note that when faced 
with a complex issue like genetic engineering, the lay public is more likely to search for 
information from news reports and rely more on expert opinion and commentaries or 
government announcements compared to other sources. However, people’s level of 
knowledge about genetic engineering remains low, even among American consumers who 
have had some history and familiarity with GM and who are accustomed to food items 
with known GM ingredients (Hallman et al., 2002). Another study using a Chinese sample 
reported even lower knowledge levels—only 1% of Li et al.’s (2002) 599 participants said 
they know a lot about biotechnology while 54% said they know nothing about it; nearly 40% 
reported having no idea of the risks associated with GM foods. Given this limited 
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knowledge, people tend to rely on individuals and institutions they trust to reduce the 
complexity of risk management decisions. Such a finding suggests the utility of the 
sociocultural approach (Siegrist, 2000; Earle, Siegrist, & Gutscher, 2012). 
Slovic (1993) pinpoints trust as the most important factor that influences attitudes, 
arguing that conflicts and controversies surrounding risk management are side effects of a 
functioning participatory democracy, but are amplified—or made highly contentious—by 
practices that systematically destroy trust. He argues that to solve conflicts, rebuilding trust 
is more fundamental than communicating information about innovations, particularly when 
issues are seen as highly personal or morally significant (Earle, Siegrist & Gutscher, 2012).   
Generally, the term “social trust” refers to trust ascribed to people outside the circle 
of family and close friends (Naef & Schupp, 2009). This study focuses on trust in three 
sources of information about GM: (1) government, (2) scientific and technical experts, and 
(3) the media. These institutions were chosen because they are major actors in the GM 
issue. Government entities permit the entry of GMOs into national borders, regulate their 
use, and release pertinent information about genetic engineering in particular and 
biotechnology in general. Scientific experts develop GMOs, rigorously test them, explain 
abstract and complex principles related to transgenic research to the public, and cooperate 
with other agencies and instrumentalities about their potential applications. The media not 
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only convey information to government, science experts, and the public, but also report on 
the issue to a variety of stakeholders. 
Conspiracy Thinking and Conspiracy Beliefs 
A conspiracy belief is a lay theory that attributes the ultimate cause of an event or 
the concealment of an event from the public’s view to a secret, unlawful, and malevolent 
plot by multiple actors seen as working together (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Compared to 
common risk concerns, conspiracy beliefs have two features: (1) they interpret unintended 
or well-intended behavior (or consequences) as malicious, and (2) they emphasize that 
certain parties (political or otherwise) benefit considerably from such conspiracies. 
Most studies on this topic deal with conspiracy thinking about political issues (e.g., 
Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010; Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009; 
Goertzel, 2011). Concerning GMOs, conspiracy theories include the notion that they are 
weapons Americans are wielding to conquer the world and to make developing countries 
more dependent on the United States for agricultural inputs (Robin, 2010; Ermakova, 
2005). While some consider GMOs as one of the solutions to the constant threat of poverty 
and hunger worldwide (Marris et al., 2001), conspiracy beliefs may distort perceptions of 
such an advantage. A recent example is the conspiracy thinking being promoted against 
golden rice, a variety with enhanced vitamin A content developed by European scientists to 
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offset vitamin A deficiency, especially among children in the developing world (Shan & 
Jin, 2012). 
In a pilot survey, the present study found a very strong positive correlation between 
subscribing to conspiracy beliefs and risk perception (r=0.67). About GM foods, 
conspiracy beliefs abound. Those who are opposed to GM technology contend, for 
example, that profit-driven giant multinational corporations that produce GM seeds are out 
to destroy organic or ecological agriculture in a move to monopolize farming around the 
world. This idea is juxtaposed with the notion that GM crops carry genes from organisms 
of different species that are likely to have adverse effects on human health. Those who 
regularly consume GMOs, according to this theory, will soon suffer from stunted physical 
growth or will eventually develop reproductive dysfunctions. 
A noteworthy characteristic of conspiracy beliefs is the use of academic and/or 
scientific sources to imbue them with some validity. Regarding the hypothesized negative 
health impacts of GM foods, two studies are widely cited. The first is an experiment 
conducted by Irina Ermakova, a neuroscientist at the Institute of Higher Nervous Activity 
and Neurophysiology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who reported that young mice 
fed with GM corn exhibited stunted growth and reproductive abilities, and registered a 
death rate six times higher than those in the control group (Ermakova, 2005). The second is 
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a French study that also reported a higher incidence of death among mice fed with GM 
soybeans (Séralini et al., 2012). Although these findings have been questioned on 
methodological grounds (e.g., too small sample size, abnormal patterns also showing up in 
the control group, the mice species used was inherently deficient) (Marshall, 2007), they 
are used to lend conspiracy beliefs an aura of scientific credibility. After all, these two 
studies’ weaknesses can be detected only by researchers who may find it difficult to 
communicate to and convince the lay public that such results are tenuous at best. These 
instances of misinformation may have enduring effects, continuously providing fertile 
grounds for conspiracy beliefs to persist unchecked. 
Low levels of social trust also can cause conspiracy beliefs to thrive. Researchers 
have shown that conspiracy beliefs correlate with anomia and low levels of interpersonal 
and social trust (Swami et al., 2010; Crocker et al., 1999). Shepherd and Kay (2012) 
conducted a series of studies that established a model showing how insufficient knowledge 
leads to system justification. They contend that lack of knowledge about GMOs is likely to 
(1) foster feelings of dependence on government, which (2) increases system justification 
and government trust, which then leads to (3) an increased desire to avoid learning more 
about the issue when the information is discrepant with what is already known. Shepherd 
and Kay (2012) illustrate that uncertainty brings psychological discomfort, leading 
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individuals to directly look for an authorized information source—usually government 
officials or experts—rather than search for more information on their own accord. 
However, this situation also can lead to distrust in government or experts. The key point of 
their model is that people will look for reliable information sources when facing 
uncertainty, and these sources may include expert opinions or rumors. Once a rumor is 
accepted, people justify such acceptance by convincing themselves that government and 
society generally cannot be trusted. This may be the prevailing situation in China where 
young people are highly skeptical of government and experts, often thinking that these 
agents do nothing but spread propaganda. 
Cynicism, Sense of Control and Conspiracy Beliefs 
Some scholars have shown that individual personality traits can explain 50% of the 
variance in subscribing to conspiracy beliefs. In other words, some people are more prone 
to conspiracy thinking (e.g., Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2010). Of these, 
those who are more cynical about many aspects of life tend to cling to conspiracy theories. 
Social psychologists view cynicism as an attitude that is characterized by frustration and 
negatively valenced beliefs, resulting primarily from unmet expectations and/or other 
facets of the external environment (Brockway, Carlson & Jones, 2002). In other words, 
cynicism may be the outcome of perceived gaps between notions of ideal democratic 
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principles and political reality, between career prospects and a cruel job market, among 
other dichotomies. Swami et al. (2010) observe that those who were cynical with the state 
of political affairs were less willing to trust authorities and were more likely to hold 
conspiracy beliefs about the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.   
Another personality trait related to conspiracy beliefs is sense of control over life 
events, which has been defined as a feeling of autonomy, of choosing how one lives his/her 
life, of doing work in one’s own way (Rubin, 2007). Whitson and Galinsky (2008) found 
that participants who lack this sense of control were more likely to hold illusory belief 
patterns, suggesting that the lack of control provokes people to seek patterns that provide 
compensatory mechanisms to restore feelings of control. Adherence to conspiracy beliefs is 
an example of such a pattern. As Knight (2002) suggests, “conspiracy theory is the poor 
person’s cognitive mapping in the post-modern age” (p. 8). 
Model Specification  
Considering the foregoing literature review, the study examines the path of 
influence or conceptual framework shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The study’s conceptual model 
In this model, willingness to purchase GM foods, a behavioral intention, is used to 
indicate people’s attitude toward GM foods. Willingness to purchase GM foods is seen as 
being influenced by people’s perception of benefits and risks. These two variables are 
hypothesized to be affected by levels of social trust as well as the degree to which people 
believe in conspiracy theories. Social trust is a latent variable measured by the extent to 
which individuals trust experts, the government, and the media. Cynicism is predicted to 
lead to subscribing more to conspiracy beliefs and lowering the level of trust people hold in  
social institutions. Another personality trait, sense of control, is expected to have a bearing 
on conspiracy beliefs. Specifically, the following hypotheses are posed: 
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H1: Higher levels of cynicism will lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs.  
H2: Higher levels of cynicism will lead to lower levels of social trust (in government, 
experts, and the media).  
H3: Higher levels of control will depress conspiracy beliefs.  
H4: Lower levels of social trust will lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs.  
H5: Higher levels of social trust will lead to higher levels of perceived benefits of GMOs.  
H6: Higher levels of social trust will lead to lower levels of perceived risks related to 
GMOs.  
H7: Stronger conspiracy beliefs will lead to lower levels of perceived benefits of GMOs.  
H8: Stronger conspiracy beliefs will lead to higher levels of perceived risks related to 
GMOs.  
H9: Higher levels of perceived risks lead to lesser willingness to purchase GM products.  
H10: Higher levels of perceived benefits lead to greater willingness to purchase GM 
products. 
The model diagrammed above will be tested on an American and a Chinese sample. 
Based on cultural and political differences between China and the U.S., this study also 
poses the following hypotheses: 
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H11: The Chinese sample will show stronger conspiracy beliefs and lower levels of social 
trust.  
H12: The effect of strength of conspiracy beliefs on risk perception and benefits perception 
will be stronger among Chinese respondents.  
H13: The Chinese sample will perceive more risk and less benefit related to GMOs 
compared to the American sample.  
H14: In general, the Chinese sample will hold less positive intentions toward GMOs than 
the American sample. 
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            CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Pilot test 
Six weeks before the main survey, a pilot survey was conducted to examine the 
reliability of each scale. Sixty-one students recruited from a sociology course returned 
valid responses. After analyzing the results, I reworded or dropped scale items with low 
factor loadings. The results of main survey indicated that these changes improved the 
reliability and validity of my survey tools. 
Participants 
To gather data for this study, an online survey of Chinese and American consumers 
was conducted. The respondents from the two countries were all college students. Similar 
life experiences among college students allowed some measure of control. The American 
students were recruited from Sociology courses in a large university in the Midwest. A 
total of 398 students were introduced to the study in their classes and were asked to 
participate by completing an online questionnaire. Of the 398 students, 306 returned valid 
questionnaires. The Chinese participants were recruited from two universities located in 
Beijing and Shanghai. Their email addresses were solicited from professors and former 
students. However, the Chinese email server closed down the link to the survey site that 
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carried the study questionnaire. Thus, the invitation to participate and the questionnaire 
were sent individually via email. A total of 342 valid responses were received from China.  
Information about informed consent and the survey questionnaire were posted 
online. For the American sample, the survey link was sent directly to the respondent’s 
email address. A week after the initial invitation, a reminder email was sent to those who 
had not returned their completed questionnaire. Extra course credits were offered to 
encourage participation. To the Chinese sample, the invitations were sent manually 
because the email server blocked invitations sent using the survey software.  
Variables and their Measurement 
The questionnaire was divided into two parts. The first part solicited demographic 
information and the extent to which respondents consider themselves informed about 
GMOs and GM products. This section was made up of multiple-choice questions. The 
second part measured respondents’ risks and benefits perception, strength of adherence to 
conspiracy beliefs, levels of social trust, and personality traits (sense of control and 
cynicism) using a series of Likert scales. The complete questionnaire is shown in Appendix 
B. 
Benefit perception in this study refers to expectations of positive outcomes 
associated with GM crops/foods. Seven scenarios were used to measure perceived benefits. 
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Respondents were asked to indicate the degree to which they think seven scenarios are 
likely to occur on a scale of 1 to 7, in which 1 means “will never occur” and 7 means “will 
surely occur.” These scenarios were as follows: (1) GM crops will reduce farmers’ 
production costs; (2) GM crops will reduce the price of food items for consumers; (3) GM 
crops will cut down pesticide use; (4) GM crops will cut down fertilizer use; (5) GM crops 
will increase yields; (6) GM crops will feed the growing population in the developing 
world; and (7) GM crops can increase the efficiency with which farmers use their land. 
Answers to these items were averaged to form an index of benefits perception. Higher 
scores indicated higher perceptions of benefits that can be derived from GM foods. This 
scale reported satisfactory reliability (Cronbach α=0.812 in the American sample and 
α=0.834 in the Chinese sample).  
Risk perception refers to the subjective judgment that people make about the 
characteristics and severity of risks related with GM crops/foods. This variable was 
measured by using scale items employed in previous research (Costa-Font & Gil, 2009; 
Moon & Balasurbramanian, 2004; Erdogan et al., 2009) although these items were re-
worded. Respondents were asked to rate how likely they thought a scenario would occur 
using a scale of 1 (“will never occur”) to 7 (“will surely occur”). Five scenarios were used 
to measure perceived risks: (1) GM crops carry genes from different species that will cause 
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potential harm to the human body; (2) When pollen from GM plants cross-pollinate with 
those of other crops, weird hybrids will result; (3) The widespread use of GM crops will 
reduce biodiversity; (4) Genetic engineering will result in immoral consequences; and (5) 
Multinational corporations are increasingly controlling farming. Higher scores mean higher 
risk perception. The answers to these five items were averaged to form an index of risk 
perception. This scale reported satisfactory reliability in the American sample (α=0.795) 
and acceptable reliability in Chinese sample (α=0.707). 
Conspiracy beliefs. The items that comprise this scale were culled from books that 
discussed the controversies and arguments surrounding genetic engineering (e.g., Jeffrey 
Smith’s Seeds of Deception, 2003, and Roulette: The Documented Health Risks of 
Genetically Engineered Foods, 2007) and online discussions on blogs, microblogs, 
discussion boards, and social networking sites. Respondents were asked to indicate the 
extent to which they agree with the following six items: (1) GMOs were originally 
invented as a weapon for biological warfare; (2) People who regularly consume GMOs will 
suffer from stunted physical growth or reproductive harm; (3) Test results on the effect of 
GMOs on health are being kept secret; (4) Giant multinational corporations that produce 
GM seeds want to destroy organic or ecological agriculture to protect their benefits; (5) 
When some countries that export GM seeds want to take over global agriculture; and (6) 
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Those officials who promote GM crops work hand-in-hand with giant biotech companies. 
Here, the response options ranged from 1 to 7 where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 
means “strongly agree.” The answers were averaged to serve as the measure of strength of 
conspiracy beliefs. Higher scores on this index suggest stronger adherence to conspiracy 
beliefs. This scale also reported satisfactory reliability (α=0.859 in the American sample 
and α=0.793 in the Chinese sample). 
Trust in government refers to the extent to which respondents believe that 
government can protect their health and other interests related to GM issues. Trust in 
government was measured by asking students the degree to which they agree with the 
following six statements that were adapted from Poortinga & Pidgeon (2006): (1) The 
government cares about what average people think about GM crops; (2) The government is 
acting in the public interest with regard to GM crops; (3) The government has done a good 
job in the past with regard to GM crops; (4) The government is competent enough to deal 
with GM crops; (5) In general, official government reports about GM crops are credible; 
and (6) The government gives high priority to people’s well-being. The response options 
ranged from 1 to 7 where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” The 
answers were averaged, and higher scores suggested higher levels of trust toward the 
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government on the GM crops issue. The reliability of this index was 0.907 and 0.886 for 
the American and the Chinese sample, respectively.  
Trust in science and technology experts refers to the degree to which people are 
confident that experts have the capability and know-how to safeguard public interests 
through their knowledge and technical capabilities. This variable also was measured using 
seven-point Likert scales derived from Costa-Font & Gill (2009). Respondents were asked 
to rate their level of agreement with the following statements using a scale that ranged 
from 1 to 7 where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree”: (1) Scientists 
who work on genetic engineering can be trusted about GM issues; (2) The way scientists 
are conducting research on GMOs will have disastrous effects (reverse scored); (3) GM 
crops have undergone rigorous scientific testing and are therefore safe; (4) Although there 
may be some uncertainties related to GM products, scientists can deal with them 
accordingly; (5) Those so-called scientists who study GMOs care more about promoting 
themselves than the public's good (reverse scored); and (6) On the GM crops issue, 
scientists stand for the truth, rather than for the interest of certain groups.. The answers to 
these items were averaged. The reliability of this scale was α=0.792 for the American 
sample and α=0.746 for the Chinese sample. 
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Trust in media refers to perceptions of expertise and trustworthiness people hold 
about the traditional (i.e., television, radio, newspapers, magazines, books) and the online 
media. Kohring and Matthes (2007), testing a multidimensional scale to measure the 
public’s trust in the media, found that general media trust could be categorized into four 
dimensions: (1) trust in the selectivity of topics, (2) trust in the selectivity of facts, (3) trust 
in the accuracy of depictions, and (4) trust in journalistic assessment. This study used five 
items from their scale that were re-worded to simplify statement structures. These were: (1) 
The media usually ignore important problems related to GM crops (reverse scored); (2) 
When reporting about GM crops, the media often take the comments and opinions of 
information sources out of context (reverse scored); (3) Media reports about GM crops are 
reliable; (4) Criticisms of GM crops in the media are expressed in an adequate manner; and 
(5) Reports about GM issues in the media are not biased in favor of any person or interest 
group. Again, respondents were asked to rate these five statements on a scale of 1 to 7 
where 1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” The answers were 
averaged; higher scores suggested stronger trust in the media. This scale reported 
acceptable reliabilities of α=0.704 and α=0.741for the American and Chinese sample, 
respectively. 
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Cynicism is “an attitude or state of mind characterized by a general distrust of 
others' apparent motives or ambitions, or a general lack of faith or hope in the human race 
or in individuals with desires, hopes, opinions, or personal tastes that a cynic perceives as 
unrealistic or inappropriate, therefore deserving of ridicule or admonishment” (Piering, 
2006). The items used to measure cynicism were derived from three sources: Citrin and 
Elkins’s (1975) cynicism scale, Dalbert et al.’s (2001) unjust scale, and the China Family 
Panel Studies’ (CFPS) value scale (ISSS, 2012). All the items of these scales were tested, 
and those which did not contribute to present study were filtered. These items aim to reflect 
whether there is a gap between expected and existing life circumstances. The original index 
had ten items; five were dropped after the pilot test. The remaining five items were as 
follows: (1) In today’s society, corruption is inevitable if you want big achievements; (2) I 
basically believe the world is an unjust place; (3) All politicians are bad; some are just 
worse than others; (4) No one can hope to stay honest once he/she enters politics; and (5) If 
politicians stick to their ideas and principles, they are unlikely to reach the top of their 
profession. Respondents were asked to rate these five statements on a scale of 1 to 7 where 
1 means “strongly disagree” and 7 means “strongly agree.” The answers were averaged; 
higher scores suggest stronger cynicism. The reliability of this five-item index was 0.799 
and 0.757 for the American and the Chinese sample, respectively.  
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Sense of control. According to Whitson & Galinsky (2008), people who feel they 
lack control over life events are more likely to perceive conspiracy. The items used to 
measure sense of control were adapted from Pearlin and Schooler (1978) and Ross (2011) 
who report reliabilities of 0.740 and 0.696, respectively. The six items that comprised the 
scale were as follows: (1) I can do just about anything I really set my mind to; (2) There is 
really no way I can solve some of the problems I have (reverse scored); (3) What happens 
to me in the future mostly depends on me; (4) I have little control over things that happen 
to me (reverse scored); (5) I often feel helpless in dealing with my problems (reverse 
scored); and (6) There is little I can do to change many of the important things in my life 
(reverse scored). The answers were averaged to serve as the measure of strength of sense of 
control. High scores on this index suggested a strong sense of control. 
Intention to purchase.   A single item was developed to measure people’s 
willingness to purchase GM foods. Respondents were asked to select the statement that 
comes closest to their intentions, using the following response scale: (1) I will be very 
cautious. I won’t choose any food that contains even a minor ingredient made from GM 
crops (e.g., seasonings); (2) I will be generally cautious. I won’t choose any food with 
main ingredients derived from GM crops (e.g., the tomato pieces in a sandwich); (3) I will 
be somewhat cautious. I won’t choose any with most or all ingredients derived from GM 
29 
 
 
crops (e.g., soybean oil or corn oil); and (4) I won’t be cautious at all.  I will choose any 
food that without regard to whether it contains GM ingredients. 
Information sources. These items measure exposure to GM information and the 
sources of that information. Respondents were asked through what sources (i.e., official 
reports from the Department of Agriculture, news reports, social networking sites, taught in 
school, personal communication, academic literature, and other sources) they get 
information about GMOs, and how often they hear, read, watch, and generally learn about 
GM topics or issues. 
Demographic variables. Respondents were asked for demographic information, 
including gender, household income before taxes in 2012, and whether their curriculum 
includes GM-related courses. 
Quality control tests. Two quality tests were embedded in the questionnaire in 
order to check whether participants were reading the questions carefully and responding 
thoughtfully.  At two points in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to select a certain 
answer. Those participants who failed to pass the first quality test were fully dropped from 
data analysis, and those failed to pass the second quality test were partially dropped. I used 
the response latency and the pattern of answers to judge whether to keep or drop responses 
preceding the second quality control test.  
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Confirmatory factor analysis 
I conducted a set of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to check the structure of 
the scales.  Results of CFA showed that in each scale, all items had high consistency. All 
but one of the scales extracted only a single factor, and most of items showed satisfactory 
factor loadings higher than 0.6. I also noticed that for every scale, the first item had the 
lowest factor loading, no matter whether the data had been  collected in America or China, 
and even though the  item had proved reliable with a high factor loading in the pilot test. 
Thus I have reason to believe that a small bias was introduced by the survey process, in 
that respondents at beginning of each set of items failed to catch the intention of the scale. 
The factor loadings of the first one or two items will always be underestimated unless 
researchers can randomize the order of items in their scales. From this point of view, 
results of CFA cannot be used as the decisive criteria to evaluate the quality of the scales. 
Full tables of CFA can be found in appendix A. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The Sample 
A total of 458 questionnaires were distributed in the United States out of which 398 
were returned. Among these, 306 passed two quality control tests. Thus, the valid U.S. 
response rate was 66.8%. Approximately 3,500 questionnaires were distributed in China of 
which 587 were returned. However, only 342 passed the quality test, resulting in a valid 
response rate of 9.7%. Table 1 shows that the American sample had a very high initial 
response rate, and almost everyone who started the survey finished it, but that a large 
proportion of invalid responses were filtered by two quality tests. For the Chinese sample,   
the initial response rate was low, and many respondents dropped out after answering the 
first two or three questions, but those who finished survey provided high quality data. We 
have reason to believe that the incentives offered to the American sample may have caused 
this phenomenon. 
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Table 1. The response rates for two sample groups 
 Questionnaires 
distributed 
Surveys started Surveys finished Valid responses 
 n n % n % n % 
American 
sample 
458 400 87.3 398 86.9 306 66.8 
Chinese 
sample 
≈3500 587 16.8 376 10.7 342 9.8 
 
Knowledge and Exposure to GM Information 
As shown in Table 2, the Chinese respondents reported being considerably more 
informed about the GM issue, with 57.3% saying they have at least some knowledge about 
GM crops. Only 33% of the American sample indicated that they have at least some 
knowledge. Of the Chinese respondents, 37.1% had taken or plan to take courses related to 
genetic engineering and GM crops; only 7.5% of the Americans said so, suggesting the 
possible introduction of bias due to the sampling strategy.  Furthermore, the results about 
information exposure confirm that the Chinese were indeed more informed about the issue. 
None of them said they had never heard about GMOs, but 11.8% of the Americans said so. 
Only 27.5% of those from the U.S. reported hearing about GMOs once or more a month, 
compared to 54.4% of the Chinese students. The Chinese respondents also reported an 
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average of 2.79 sources of information about the topic, while the Americans indicated only 
an average of 1.72. 
Table 2. Gender, knowledge, and GM information in the samples 
 U.S. (n=306) China (n=342) 
 n % n % 
Gender     
    Male 148 48.4 119 34.8 
Knowledge about GM      
Know a lot  4 1.3 9 2.6 
Know some  97 31.7 187 54.7 
Know very little  205 67 146 42.7 
     
GM in the curriculum     
Have taken GM-related courses 11 3.6 114 33.3 
Will take GM-related courses 12 3.9 13 3.8 
Will not take GM-related courses 239 78.1 206 60.2 
Have no idea 44 14.4 9 2.6 
     
Frequency of exposure to GM 
information 
    
Never heard about it 36 11.8 0 0 
Hear about it a few times a year 186 60.8 156 45.6 
Hear about it about once a month 58 19.0 131 38.3 
Hear about it several times a month 24 7.8 49 14.3 
Hear about it several times a week 2 0.7 6 1.8 
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Table 2. Continued       Gender, knowledge, and GM information in the samples 
 U.S. (n=306) China (n=342) 
 n % n % 
GM information sources     
Department of Agriculture 25 8.2 63 18.4 
News reports 192 62.7 304 88.9 
Social networking sites 71 23.2 185 54.1 
Taught in school 89 29.1 163 47.7 
Interpersonal communication 96 31.4 134 39.2 
Academic literature 45 14.7 93 27.2 
Other sources 11 3.6 14 4.1 
Don’t get any information at all 61 19.9 1 0.3 
     
Average number of information 
sources 
 1.72  2.79 
Table 3 lists the means and the standard deviations for all scales used in this study. 
It shows that the Chinese sample held stronger conspiracy beliefs and lower levels of trust 
in experts and in the media compared to their U.S. counterparts. The difference between 
the two groups with respect to trust in government was not statistically significant. Thus, 
H11 was supported. The Chinese students did report higher levels of risk perception but 
also higher levels of benefits perception than U.S. students, and these differences were 
statistically significant. Figure 3 shows a plot of American and Chinese students’ attitudes, 
based on their levels of perceived risks and benefits.  As Figure 3 indicates, American 
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respondents fall in the upper left quadrant (using a value of four as the axis), which can be 
considered a positive attitude, whereas Chinese respondents fall in the upper right quadrant, 
which can be interpreted as an ambivalent attitude toward GMO. In other words, H13 was 
not supported.  Other results from Table 3 indicate that the Chinese respondents showed 
statistically significant lower levels of sense of control and higher levels of cynicism. The 
difference between the two groups in terms of willingness to purchase GM products was 
significant at α=0.1 level. Thus, H14 was supported. Chinese respondents had lower 
intentions to consume GM products. 
Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviations for the scales  
 U.S. China  
 M SD M         SD t value 
Conspiracy beliefs 3.12 1.08 4.08 1.05 -8.11
***
 
Risk perception 3.94 1.02 4.15 0.85 -2.05
*
 
Benefit perception 4.73 0.89 5.04 0.92 -2.94
**
 
Trust in experts 4.46 0.87 4.12 0.86 3.50
**
 
Trust in government 3.97 1.12 3.86 1.07 0.83 
Trust in media 3.55 0.81 3.12 0.76 4.92
***
 
Sense of control 5.35 1.07 4.08 0.86 13.01
***
 
Cynicism 3.80 1.16 4.12 1.09 -2.55
**
 
Intention to purchase 3.00 0.88 2.84 0.84 1.67
*
 
One-tail t-test; * Significant at the 0.05 level; ** Significant at the 0.01 level; *** 
Significant at 0.001 the level. 
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Figure 3. Attitudes as a function of perceived risks and benefits 
Correlation Analysis 
Bivariate correlation analyses were conducted to explore the relationship between the 
variables. The results for the American and the Chinese samples are shown in Tables 4 and 
5, respectively. In general, the two samples exhibited common patterns, including support 
for H1, H2, H3, H7, H8, H9, and H10. The correlations differed markedly, however, in 
several ways.  In the U.S. sample, the data show that trust in media negatively correlated 
with conspiracy beliefs, positively correlated with benefits perception, and negatively 
correlated with risk perception. These findings suggest that media reports weaken risk 
perception and counter conspiracy thinking. However, trust in media played an opposite 
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role in China. In the Chinese sample, trust in media positively correlated with conspiracy 
beliefs, and was associated with lower benefits perception and higher risk perception. In 
short, media reports in China tended to amplify risk perception. Furthermore, trust in 
government was positively associated with benefits perception in the American sample, a 
relationship that was not observed in the Chinese sample.  In other words, these 
correlations provide only partial support for H4, H5, and H6.As expected, risk and benefits 
perceptions were negatively correlated in the American sample, but not so in the Chinese 
sample. This suggests that Chinese respondents hold more ambivalent attitudes toward GM 
crops.  
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Table 4. Correlation table for the American sample 
 
*Significant at the 0.05 level; **Significant at 0.01 the level 
 
Table 5. Correlation table for the Chinese sample 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Conspiracy beliefs - -         
2. Benefits perception -.281
**
 - -        
3. Risks perception .548
**
 .005 - -       
4. Trust in experts -.556
**
 .255
**
 -.473
**
 - -      
5. Trust in government -.213
**
 .061 -.249
**
 .447
**
 - -     
6. Trust in media .094 -.201
**
 -.064 .112
*
 .372
**
 - -    
7. Sense of control -.120
*
 .054 -.023 .076 .103 .056 - -   
8. Cynicism .127
*
 .138
*
 .076 -.137
*
 -.257
**
 -.137
*
 -.191
**
 - -  
9. Intention of purchase -.442
**
 .257
**
 -.340
**
 .393
**
 .169
*
 -.126
*
 .012 -.033 - - 
*Significant at 0.05 the level; **Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Conspiracy beliefs - -         
2. Benefits perception -.340
**
 - -        
3. Risks perception .598
**
 -.277
**
 - -       
4. Trust in experts -.551
**
 .433
**
 -.556
**
 - -      
5. Trust in government -.372
**
 .308
**
 -.417
**
 .522
**
 - -     
6. Trust in media -.206
**
 .162
**
 -.237
**
 .241
**
 .450
**
 - -    
7. Sense of control -.129
*
 -.062 -.136
*
 .084 .017 .061 - -   
8. Cynicism .179
**
 -.035 .122
*
 -.149
**
 -.304
**
 -.320
**
 -.192
**
 - -  
9. Intention of purchase -.356
**
 .318
**
 -.367
**
 .432
**
 .305
**
 .089 .008 .028 - - 
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Structural Equation Model 
To determine the relationships between the variables identified in the conceptual 
framework and the path of influence leading to people’s willingness to purchase GM foods, 
structural equation modeling was applied. SEMs combined path analysis and factor analysis 
to allow modeling of multiple dependent variables, estimation of their direct and indirect 
effects on risks/benefits perception, and measurement of unobserved general social trust. A 
good fitting model means that my theoretical analysis closely matches my empirical data. 
The model estimation method is default maximum likelihood. Factor scores which were 
generated through CFA were entered in the SEM model for parameter estimation. The major 
assumptions associated with structural equation modeling include: multivariate normality, no 
systematic missing data, sufficiently large sample size, and correct model specification. Q-Q 
plots showed that the factor scores for each variable fit in a straight line, which suggested 
that these variables did not violate the assumption of multivariate normal distribution. Both 
samples reached large enough size, and there were very few observations with missing values, 
and these cases were simply deleted from SEM analysis.  
The American sample. A chi square goodness of fit test showed high values that 
were significantly different from zero, indicating that the theoretical model predicting 
perceptions of risk and benefits did not fit the data. The Root Mean Square Error of 
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Approximation (RMSEA) was higher than the acceptable boundary of 0.10. Moreover, the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) were all lower than 0.90, 
also suggesting unsatisfactory model fit (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4. Standardized estimation of the theoretical model for the American sample 
The path analysis results shown in Figure 4 offer a number of insights. First, they 
suggest that trust in experts best represents the more complex construct, social trust, and that 
trust in media is not closely related to social trust. Second, cynicism is not a good indicator of 
conspiracy thinking when sense of control is included in the model. Third, conspiracy beliefs 
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positively correlated with risks perception, but did not appear to have a significant impact on 
benefits perception in the context of this model.  
The Chinese sample. The theoretical model did not register any fit with the data 
from China. The chi square value was very high and two fitness indices (CFI and TLI) were 
much lower than the acceptable boundaries. Figure 6 indicates that trust in experts best 
represented social trust in this case, and that trust in media was not related to social trust at 
all. Further residual analysis indicated a strong correlation between cynicism and benefits 
perception, which was difficult to explain. 
 
Figure 5. Standardized estimation of the theoretical model for the Chinese sample 
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Revised path model 
Neither of the two theoretical models above demonstrated satisfactory fit, which 
indicated that my theory framework did not closely match the reality. Judging from the 
results above and the residual matrices, I gave up SEM and developed a simple path model. 
In this model, trust in government and media were dropped, because only trust in experts 
worked best for both counties and was the most relevant kind of trust regarding attitudes 
toward GMO.  Cynicism was closely tied to trust in government, so it was dropped, since 
trust in government was not directly relevant to GMO.  Sense of control did not seem 
relevant to conspiracy beliefs about GMO, so it was dropped also. Residual matrices showed 
that trust in experts and conspiracy beliefs might both directly and indirectly influence 
intentions to purchase. The error term of risks perception and benefits perception were 
correlated in the Chinese sample. 
The revised path model proved a perfect fit. The results of the path model overturned 
conclusions from a previous study that attitude toward GMO is almost fully mediated 
through risk and benefit perception (Moon & Balasurbramanian, 2004). Both the American 
and Chinese samples there was direct influence from trust in experts and/or conspiracy 
beliefs. For American sample, trust in experts was an even stronger predictor of intention to 
purchase GM foods than risk and benefit perception, while conspiracy beliefs were not 
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significant. For the Chinese sample, the strength of conspiracy beliefs was the strongest 
predictor of intention, while benefit perception did not explain the intention of purchase GM 
foods. The power of equations to explain the variance of risk and benefit perception was 
weaker for Chinese sample. Furthermore, in the Chinese sample there was a significant 
correlation between the error terms of risk and benefit perception. While Chinese participants 
had higher levels of conspiracy beliefs, it is interesting to note that the impact of conspiracy 
beliefs on risk and benefit perception was stronger for Americans.  In other words, H12 was 
not supported. 
Table 5. A summary of paths in the two empirical models 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Structural model   
Conspiracy beliefs   
Trust in experts -.551** -.530** 
R
2
 .303 .281 
Benefit perception    
Conspiracy beliefs -.154* -.120 
Trust in experts .352** .178** 
R
2
 .202 .068 
Risk perception    
Conspiracy beliefs .424** .264** 
Trust in experts -.319** -.276** 
R
2
 .403 .228 
Intention of purchase    
Trust in experts .244** .169** 
Conspiracy beliefs -.091 -.281** 
Benefit perception .140** .070 
Risk perception -.141* -.153** 
R
2
 .233 .255 
Covariance   
e. risk perception 
e. benefit perception 
0.01 0.13** 
*Significant at 0.05 level    **Significant at 0.01 level 
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Figure 6. Standardized estimation of the empirical model for the American sample 
 
Figure 7. Standardized estimation of the empirical model for the Chinese sample 
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Summary 
Table 6 summarizes the results of hypotheses testing. 
Table 6. The summary of the results of hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis Result 
H1: Higher levels of cynicism lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs. Supported 
H2: Higher levels of cynicism lead to lower levels of social trust Supported 
H3: Higher levels of control will depress conspiracy beliefs. Supported 
H4: Lower levels of social trust lead to stronger conspiracy beliefs. Partially supported 
H5: Higher levels of social trust lead to higher levels of perceived 
benefits of GMOs. 
Partially supported 
H6: Higher levels of social trust lead to lower levels of perceived 
risks related to GMOs. 
Partially supported 
H7: Stronger conspiracy beliefs lead to lower levels of perceived 
benefits of GMOs. 
Supported 
H8: Stronger conspiracy beliefs lead to higher levels of perceived 
risks related to GMOs. 
Supported 
H9: Higher levels of perceived risks are associated with lesser 
willingness to purchase GM foods. 
Supported 
H10: Higher levels of perceived benefits are associated with 
greater willingness to purchase GM foods. 
Supported 
H11: The Chinese sample will show stronger conspiracy beliefs 
and lower levels of social trust. 
Supported 
H12: The effect of strength of conspiracy beliefs on risk 
perception and benefit perception will be stronger among the 
Chinese respondents. 
Not supported 
H13: The Chinese sample will perceive more risk and less benefit 
related to GMOs compared to the American sample. 
Partially supported 
H14: In general, the Chinese sample will hold a less positive 
attitude toward GMOs than the American sample. 
Supported 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
This comparative study reveals some inner mechanisms of how American and 
Chinese consumers develop perceptions of risk and benefits related to GM crops. The 
findings showed that the Chinese participants were more involved in the GM issue than their 
American counterparts. They also reported more sources of information from which they 
learn about the topic more frequently. This may be due to a higher density of media coverage 
in early September 2012, triggered by the controversial American-led experiment with 
golden rice that rekindled yet again the long-standing debate about the risks and benefits of 
GM products in the country. The American respondents demonstrated lower levels of both 
risk and benefits perception probably resulting from their lesser involvement with the issue. 
Despite this, the Americans expressed higher acceptance of GM crops.  
The findings also show that holding conspiracy beliefs about GM crops is a powerful 
predictor of risk and benefits perceptions. Specifically, strong conspiracy beliefs led to low 
perceptions of GM crops’ benefits and high perception of risks attendant to their 
consumption. 
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The findings support previous studies’ conclusions (e.g., those of Titchener & Sapp, 
2002; Slovic, 1993; Chen & Li, 2006) about the causality between social trust and risk and 
benefit perceptions, specifically suggesting that higher levels of social trust lead to stronger 
benefits perception and weaker perceptions of risk. Trust in experts was found to be most 
closely related to perceptions of risk and benefits. 
The influence of personality traits on conspiracy beliefs was partially verified. That is, 
lower levels of sense of control tended to strengthen conspiracy beliefs, but the influence of 
cynicism was not significant when trust in the three institutions was controlled for. This 
study also found personality variables were not strong predictors of attitudes toward GM 
crops, and these variables were dropped in the revised path model. 
Finally, the results indicate that cultural factors have a bearing on the strength of the 
coefficients. Trust in experts, the government, and the media appeared to be strong 
dimensions of social trust in the American context. In China, however, trust in media did not 
help to bolster social trust. Because social trust was the most important determinant of risk 
perception in the U.S. sample, cultivating social trust appears to be the most direct and 
effective way of enhancing the acceptance of GM technology. The Chinese situation is more 
complex. The results indicate that to improve the public’s acceptance of GM crops, repelling 
conspiracy beliefs is the most important and urgent task. To do this, an indirect but 
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fundamental approach is to strengthen the credibility of government, experts, and the media.  
Another approach would be to “inoculate” the public against conspiracy thinking.  This 
might be done by first alerting the public to the threat of conspiracy beliefs, and then 
providing them with specific refutations to the potential conspiracy messages they may 
receive. 
This study partially revises Costa-Font’s (2009) model of people’s acceptance of GM 
foods as determined by risk and benefits perception. Rooted in classic economic theories, this 
model assumes that individuals are rational decision-makers intent on maximizing the utility 
of products and services. Although the Chinese respondents did not disproportionately 
perceive more risks than benefits from GM crops in the present study, their willingness to 
consume GM foods was, however, significantly lower than that of the Americans. This 
suggests that the way people make choices about the food items they consume is more 
complex, apparently relying on more than risk and benefits perceptions. Modes of thinking, 
including the degree to which people cling to conspiracy beliefs, may distort risk and benefit 
evaluations. 
In summary, the Chinese respondents in the present study expressed less willingness 
to purchase GM crops and GM products. The structural model of influence resulting from 
empirical data suggests that the Chinese exhibited higher levels of risk perception and 
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benefits perception, stronger conspiracy beliefs, and weaker social trust. This finding lends 
support to the significance of social trust as an antecedent of risk and benefits perceptions. 
More importantly, however, it adds to the body of literature by placing conspiracy beliefs 
into consideration.  
Implications of the Findings to Theory and Practice 
Most studies in the Western world emphasize the need for a more participatory 
dialogue among stakeholders to arrive at a consensus about measures that should be taken to 
ensure public safety as GM crops become common ingredients of food items. The findings of 
the present study indicate that public acceptance of GM foods in developing countries may 
be embedded in broader themes such as perceived inequality, power imbalance between and 
among nations separating the “haves” and “have nots,” and the clamor for political reforms 
in the domestic sphere. The findings for China imply that there is no “one size fits all” 
strategy to enhance the acceptance of GM crops.  
This study also broadened the study of the impact of conspiracy beliefs and 
conspiracy thinking to how people come to accept or reject  scientific innovations. People 
hold conspiracy beliefs not only about political events, but also about what may result from 
the adoption of new technology in an age of globalization. The Chinese respondents reported 
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stronger conspiracy beliefs than the Americans in this study, a pattern that may be manifested 
in any comparison of consumer propensities in developing and developed societies. 
Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study has four major weaknesses. The first is the bias introduced in the sampling 
strategy because (1) respondents were recruited from few universities; (2) a large proportion 
of the American respondents were social science majors; and (3) the American respondents 
received incentives for their participation while the Chinese respondents did not. Second, the 
study did not take into account the quality of information derived from different sources. It 
also did not ascertain how often the respondents get information from one particular source 
and how satisfied they were with that source. Future studies should determine the role of 
each particular source in cultivating social trusts and conspiracy beliefs. Third, the Chinese 
universities blocked the invitations to participate sent via the software system, thus 
precluding the sending of reminders to encourage participation or the calculation of an 
accurate response rate. Fourth, the present study offered few clues as to why the Americans 
reported lower levels of conspiracy beliefs. Is this due to higher levels of social trust or 
simply because GMOs are considered to be American (i.e., ingroup) products?  
Further research could achieve greater external validity by using a probability sample. 
The study’s framework could be replicated in other countries, making it possible to draw 
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valid comparisons between and among developing and developed nations. Qualitative 
methods could probe deeply how and why people, especially those with great potential to 
serve as opinion leaders, succumb to conspiracy beliefs. Experimental designs would be able 
to detect the degree to which conspiracy beliefs can distort risk perception. The results of 
these kinds of studies would further scholars’ understanding of people’s perceptions of risks 
and benefits, and could assist in the development of strategies that enhance the dialogue 
between and among stakeholders.  
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APPENDIX A 
RESULTS OF CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSES 
 
Summary of items and factor loading for perceived risks 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. Multinational corporations which 
produce GM seeds will increasingly 
control farming. 
.592 .549 .573 .596 
2. GM crops carry genes from 
different species that will cause 
harm to the human body. 
.758 .426 .661 .563 
3. Genetic engineering will result in 
immoral consequences. 
.793 .372 .636 .595 
4. When pollen from GM plants 
cross-pollinate with other crops, 
weird hybrids will result. 
.753 .433 .636 .595 
5. The widespread use of GM crops 
will harm biodiversity. 
.796 .366 .698 .513 
Eigenvalue 2.754  2.457  
% of variance 55.074  49.137  
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Summary of items and factor loading for perceived benefits 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. Some varieties of GM crops will 
cut down pesticide use. 
.708 .499 .756 .428 
2. Some varieties of GM crops will 
cut down fertilizer use 
.726 .473 .730 .467 
3. By increasing per unit yield, GM 
crops will increase the efficiency 
with which people use their land. 
.793 .371 .786 .382 
4. GM crops will reduce the 
production costs for farmers. 
.633 .599 .762 .419 
5. GM crops will reduce the price of 
food items for consumers. 
.560 .687 .640 .590 
6. Adopting GM crops will feed the 
growing population in the 
developing world. 
.663 .560 .649 .579 
7. Planting more GM crops will 
increase the yields. 
.729 .469 .662 .562 
Eigenvalue 3.342  3.571  
% of variance 47.750  51.010  
 
 
Summary of items and factor loading for conspiracy beliefs 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. GMOs were originally invented as 
a weapon for biological warfare. 
.586 .656 .552 .696 
2. People who regularly consume 
GM food will suffer from stunted 
physical growth or reproductive 
harm. 
.772 .404 .686 .529 
3. The true test results of the effects 
of GM crops on human health are 
being kept secret. 
.823 .322 .649 .589 
4. Giant multinational corporations 
that produce GM seeds want to 
destroy organic or ecological 
agriculture for their benefit. 
.790 .376 .797 .364 
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5. Countries that export GM seeds 
want to take over global agriculture. 
.791 .374 .788 .379 
6. Government officials who 
promote GM crops work hand-in-
hand with giant biotech companies. 
.822 .325 .727 .472 
Eigenvalue 3.542  2.980  
% of variance 59.037  49.672  
 
 
Summary of items and factor loading for trust in experts 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. Scientists and experts who work 
on genetic engineering can be 
trusted about the GM issue. 
.625 .610 .750 .437 
2. On the GM crops issue, scientists 
stand for the truth, rather than the 
interest of certain groups. 
.707 .500 .598 .642 
3. GM crops have undergone 
rigorous scientific testing and are 
therefore safe. 
.712 .493 .789 .378 
4. Although there may be some 
uncertainties related to GM 
products, scientists can deal with 
them accordingly. 
.777 .396 .754 .431 
5. The way scientist are conducting 
research on GMOs will have 
disastrous effects. 
.747 .441 .612 .638 
6. Scientists and experts who study 
GMOs care more about their 
reputation than the public good. 
.636 .596 .562 .654 
Eigenvalue 2.963  2.690  
% of variance 49.391  44.830  
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
Summary of items and factor loading for trust in government 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. The government cares about what 
people think about GM crops. 
.755 .430 .644 .585 
2. The government is acting in the 
public interest with regard to GM 
crops. 
.853 .273 .832 .308 
3. The government gives high 
priority to the people’s well-being. 
.865 .252 .860 .260 
4. The government has done a good 
job in the past with regard to GM 
crops. 
.820 .328 .829 .312 
5. In general, official government 
reports about GM crops are credible. 
.834 .305 .829 .313 
6. The government is competent 
enough to deal with GM crops. 
.851 .275 .811 .342 
Eigenvalue 4.136  3.879  
% of variance 68.937  64.652  
 
Summary of items and factor loading for trust in media 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. The media usually ignore 
important problems related to GM 
crops. 
.594 .645 .596 .645 
2. When reporting about GM crops, 
the media often take the comments 
and opinions of information sources 
out of context. 
.646 .583 .738 .455 
3. Media reports about GM crops are 
reliable. 
.784 .385 .753 .433 
4. Criticisms of GM crops in the 
media are expressed in an adequate 
manner. 
.752 .435 .730 .467 
5. Reports about GM issues in the 
media are not biased in favor of any 
person or interest group. 
.811 .343 .692 .521 
Eigenvalue 2.610  2.678  
% of variance 48.194  49.556  
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Summary of items and factor loading for cynicism 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness Factor 
loading 
Uniqueness 
1. In today’s society, corruption is 
inevitable if you want big 
achievements. 
.617 .619 .584 .659 
2. I basically believe the world is an 
unjust place. 
.641 .589 .606 .533 
3. All politicians are bad; some are 
just worse than others. 
.815 .335 .784 .385 
4. No one can hope to stay honest 
once he/she enters politics. 
.853 .273 .834 .305 
5. If politicians stick to their ideas 
and principles, they are unlikely to 
reach the top of their profession. 
.789 .377 .755 .431 
Eigenvalue 2.807  2.587  
% of variance 59.150  51.737  
 
Summary of items and factor loading for sense of control 
 American sample Chinese sample 
Item Factor loading* Unique-
ness 
Factor loading* Unique-
ness 
1. I can do just about anything I really set 
my mind to. 
.518 .497 .485 .426 .722 .293 
2. There is really no way I can solve 
some of the problems I have (reverse 
scored). 
.716 .030 .487 .588 -.189 .619 
3. What happens to me in the future 
mostly depends on me. 
.520 .637 .323 .549 .605 .507 
4. I have little control over things that 
happen to me (reverse scored). 
.713 .086 .484 .701 .032 .332 
5. I often feel helpless in dealing with my 
problems (reverse scored). 
.710 -.491 .255 .760 -.324 .318 
6. There is little I can do to change many 
of the important things in my life (reverse 
scored). 
.757 -.426 .245 .712 -.429 .307 
Eigenvalue 2.637 1.084  2.405 1.213  
% of variance 43.945 18.068  40.086 20.218  
*Two factors were extracted. 
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APPENDIX B 
STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
What is your gender? (你的性别是什么？) 
1. Male（男） 
2. Female（女） 
What is your college classification? （你的年级是？） 
1. Freshman （大一） 
2. Sophomore （大二） 
3. Junior （大三） 
4. Senior （大四） 
5. Others （其他） 
What was your family’s combined household income before taxes in 2011? (你家 2011年的税前总
收入大约是多少？如果你不知道，请估计一个数值。) 
1. Lower than $10,000（少于 10000元） 
2. From $10,000 to $19,999（10000元至 19999元） 
3. From $20,000 to $29,999 
4. From $30,000 to $39,999 
5. From $40,000 to $49.999 
6. From $50,000 to $59,999 
7. From $60,000 to $69,999 
8. From $70,000 to $79,999 
9. From $80,000 to $99,999 
10. From $100,000 to $119,999 
11. From $120,000 to $139,999 
12. From $140,000 to $159,999 
13. $160,000 and above（大于 160000元） 
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14. I don’t know（我不知道） 
15. Refuse to answer（拒绝回答） 
How much do you know about GM technology? You define yourself as one who: （你觉得你是一个） 
1. Knows a lot about GM technology （对转基因技术了解很多的人） 
2. Knows some about GM technology （对转基因技术有一些了解的人） 
3. Knows very little about GM technology （对转基因技术所知甚少的人） 
Does your curriculum include any course that discusses GM technology? （你的课程设置中是否有
课程涉及转基因技术？） 
1. Yes, I have taken these courses. （是，我已经上过该部分课程） 
2. Yes, but I haven't taken these courses yet.（是，但我还没有上过该部分课程） 
3. No, my curriculum does not include such courses. （否，我的课程设置中不包含这些内容） 
4. I don’t know or I am not sure. （我不确定） 
How often do you read or hear about genetic engineering, GM technology, or GM crops?  （你听到
或读到关于基因工程、转基因技术、转基因作物的频率是多少？） 
1. Never heard about it （从来没有听到过） 
2. Very rarely, about once or twice a year （非常少，每年一两次） 
3. About once a month （大约每月一次） 
4. Several times a month （每月数次） 
5. Several times a week or more frequently than that. （每周数次或者更频繁） 
Through what sources do you get information about GM crops? (Please circle all that applies.) （通
过以下哪些途径你获取有关转基因作物的信息？本题可多选） 
1. Official reports from the Department of Agriculture （农业部的官方报告） 
2. News reports （新闻报道） 
3. Social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) （社交网络，例如人人网，微博） 
4. Taught in school （学校授课） 
5. Personal communication （私人交谈） 
6. Scientific journals and literature （学术文献） 
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7. Other methods, please specify___________________________ （其他途径，请说明） 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 
Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 
Strongly agree
（非常同意） 
1. GMOs were originally 
invented as a weapon for 
biological warfare. 转基因
作物起初是作为生物武器
研究出来的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. People who regularly 
consume GM food will 
suffer from stunted 
physical growth or 
reproductive harm. 经常摄
入转基因食品会导致生长
迟缓或生殖损伤。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. The true test results of the 
effects of GM crops on 
human health are being 
kept secret. 转基因作物对
于健康的影响的真实研究
结果未被公之于众。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. Giant multinational 
corporations that produce 
GM seeds want to destroy 
organic or ecological 
agriculture to protect their 
benefits. 生产转基因种子
的巨头企业想要毁掉有机
农业/生态农业来保障它
们的利益。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. When some countries that 
export GM seeds want to 
take over global 
agriculture. 当一些国家出
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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口转基因种子时，它们想
要控制全球农业。 
6. Those officials who 
promote GM crops work 
hand-in-hand with giant 
biotech companies.  那些
推广转基因作物的政府官
员一定和生物巨头走的很
近。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
The following are scenarios some have predicted following a country’s adoption of GMOs.  How 
likely do you think the following will occur? （以下是对于采用了转基因生物之后的一些预测后果，
你觉得这些后果有多大的可能性会出现？） 
 Very unlikely（非
常不可能） 
 
Very likely（非常
可能） 
1. GM crops could increase 
farm yields. 种植转基因作
物可以增加产量。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. Adopting GM crops is a way 
to feed the growing 
population in the 
developing world. 采用转
基因作物是满足发展中国
家不断增长的人口的一种
办法。  
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. GM crops could cut down 
pesticide use. 转基因作物
可以降低杀虫剂的使用
量。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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4. GM crops could cut down 
fertilizer use. 转基因作物
可以降低化肥的使用量。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. By increasing per unit yield, 
GM crops can increase the 
efficiency with which 
farmers use their land. 通
过增加每单位面积的产
量，转基因作物可以使人
们更有效的使用土地。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
6. GM crops can reduce 
farmers’ production costs. 
转基因作物可以降低农民
的生产成本。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
7. GM crops can reduce the 
price of food items for 
consumers. 转基因作物可
以为消费者降低食品价
格。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
8. Genetic engineering is 
immoral. 基因工程是不道
德的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
9. When pollen from GM 
plants cross-pollinate with 
those of other crops, weird 
hybrids will result. 当转基
因植物的花粉传给其他植
物时，可能会导致怪异的
杂交。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
10. The widespread use of GM 
crops will harm 
biodiversity. 广泛种植转基
因作物会损害生物多样
性。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
70 
 
 
11. GM crops carry genes from 
different species that will 
cause harm to human 
health. 转基因作物携带的
其他物种的基因会损害人
类健康。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
12. Multinational corporations 
that produce GM seeds are 
increasingly controlling 
farming. 生产转基因种子
的跨国企业正强化对于农
业的控制。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
13. Please drag the slide to 7 
(very likely) and move to 
the next page. 请将滑块拖
曳到 7“非常可能”并进
入下一页 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
How much do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 Strongly agree
（非常同意） 
1. Scientists and experts who 
work on genetic 
engineering can be trusted 
about the GM issue. 致力
于基因工程的科学家和专
家在转基因问题上是可以
信赖的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. On the GM crops issue, 
scientists stand for the 
truth, rather than the 
interest of certain groups. 
在转基因作物的问题上，
科学家代表的是真理而不
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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是某一群体的利益。 
3. GM crops have undergone 
rigorous scientific testing 
and are therefore safe. 转
基因作物经过了严格的科
学检验，因而是安全的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. Although there may be 
some uncertainties related 
to GM products, scientists 
can deal with them 
accordingly. 尽管转基因产
品还存在着一些不确定
性，科学家有能力很好地
处理它们。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. The way scientist are 
conducting research on 
GMOs will have disastrous 
effects. 科学家研究转基因
生物会带来灾难性的后
果。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
6. Scientists and experts who 
study GMOs care more 
about their reputation than 
the public good. 那些被称
为学者和专家的转基因生
物研究者，比起公共利益
更关心自己的名声。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
To what extent do you agree with following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 Strongly agree
（非常同意） 
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1. The government cares 
about what people think 
about GM crops. 政府关注
人们对于转基因作物的态
度。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. The government is acting in 
the public interest with 
regard to GM crops. 政府
在转基因作物一事上以公
众的利益为准。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. The government gives high 
priority to the people’s 
well-being. 政府将公众的
幸福置于优先位置。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. The government has done a 
good job in the past with 
regard to GM crops. 政府
在转基因作物一事上一直
表现良好。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. In general, official 
government reports about 
GM crops are credible.  一
般而言，关于转基因作物
的政府报告是可信的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
6. The government is 
competent enough to deal 
with GM crops. 政府有足
够的能力处理转基因作物
事宜。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 Strongly agree
（非常同意） 
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1. The media usually ignore 
important problems on GM 
crops issue. 媒体在转基因
作物一事上经常忽略重要
的问题。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. The media often take the 
comments and opinions of 
information sources out of 
context. 媒体经常断章取
义。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. Media reports about GM 
crops are reliable. 媒体对
于转基因作物的报道通常
是可信的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. Criticism of GM crops in the 
media is expressed in an 
adequate manner. 媒体上
的批评是以合适的方式表
述的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. The reports about GM 
issues in the media are 
independent and not 
biased by any interest 
group. 媒体上对转基因方
面的报道是独立的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 Strongly agree
（非常同意） 
1. I keep myself informed 
about GMOs. 我一直关注
关于转基因生物的讯息。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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2. I would be happy to take 
part in a public discussion 
about GM food. 我乐于参
与关于转基因食品的公共
讨论。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. I would be happy to talk 
about GM food with my 
family, friends, and/or 
colleagues. 我乐于与家
人、朋友、同事谈论转基
因食品的话题。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. This is a test item, please 
select “Strongly agree.” 这
是一个检验项，请选择
“非常同意” 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. Genetic engineering 
interests me. 我对基因工
程感兴趣。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
6. I pay attention to whether 
the food I eat contains GM 
ingredients.  我关注食物是
否含有转基因成分。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 
Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 
Strong agree（非
常同意） 
1. In today’s society, 
corruption is inevitable if 
you want to have big 
achievement. 当今社会，
要干大事就不可避免要腐
败。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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2. I basically believe the world 
is an unjust place.  我总体
上觉得世界是不公平的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
3. All politicians are bad--
some are just worse than 
others. 政治家都是坏的，
只不过一些比另一些更坏
而已。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. No one can hope to stay 
honest once he/she enters 
politics.没人可以指望在步
入政界后还保持诚实。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. If politicians stick to their 
ideas and principles, they 
are unlikely to reach the 
top of their profession.如果
政治家坚持他们的理念和
原则，那么他们就不可能
爬到高位。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? （你在多大程度上同意下列陈述？） 
 
Strongly disagree
（非常不同意） 
 
Strong agree（非
常同意） 
1. I can do just about anything 
I really set my mind to.只要
我想做的事情我都能实
现。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
2. There is really no way I can 
solve some of my 
problems . 我有一些问题
是我实在没有办法去解决
的。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
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3. What happens to me in the 
future mostly depends on 
me.我的未来主要由我决
定。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
4. I have little control over 
things that happen to me.
我对发生在我身上的事情
缺少控制。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
5. I often feel helpless in 
dealing with problems.  我
经常觉得处理生活中的困
难是感到无助。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
6. There is little I can do to 
change many of the 
important things in my life. 
我几乎没有办法去改变一
些生活中的重要事件。 
⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ ⃝ 
 
With respect to GM crops, what level of restriction do you favor most? （对于转基因作物，下列
哪种程度的约束是你最同意的） 
1. Ban all GM technology. （禁止所有转基因技术） 
2. Apply GM technology only to cotton and flowers. （只能应用于棉花和鲜花上） 
3. May be applied to crops used to feed animals. （能应用于喂养动物的作物上） 
4. May be applied to fruits and vegetables. （能应用在蔬菜和水果上） 
5. May be applied to staple foods. （能应用在人类的主粮上） 
Under what situation will you choose the following?  （在下列哪一种情况下你不会选择该食品） 
1. Food that contains little GM ingredient (e.g., as seasonings.（在调味品中含有少许转基因
成分） 
2. One of main ingredients is made from GM crops (e.g., the tomato pieces in hamburger). 
（一项主要原料是由转基因作物制成，例如汉堡中的西红柿片来自转基因西红柿） 
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3. Most or all of the ingredients are made from GM crops (e.g., soybean oil). （大部分，或者
完全由转基因作物制成，例如大豆食用油） 
4. I won’t change my shopping habits because some food items may contain GM ingredients. 
（我不会因为转基因的原因改变我的消费习惯。） 
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